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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
HARTFORD DIVISION
In Re:

Chapter 11

THE NORWICH ROMAN CATHOLIC
DIOCESAN CORPORATION,

Case No. 21-20687 (JJT)

Debtor.

OBJECTION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED
CREDITORS TO THE DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN
ORDER EXTENDING ITS EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD FOR THE FILING
AND SOLICITATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF A CHAPTER 11 PLAN
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) in the above captioned
bankruptcy case, by and through its undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., hereby objects
to the Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Extending Its Exclusivity Period for the Filing and
Solicitation of Acceptance of a Chapter 11 Plan (ECF Doc. No. 330, the “Exclusivity Motion”). The
Exclusivity Motion should be denied because the Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation
(the “Debtor”) has grossly mismanaged, or simply failed to manage, its bankruptcy estate and this
bankruptcy case, and such failure will be a major obstacle to a successful reorganization in this
case. As further detailed below, the Debtor’s professionals incurred almost $1.2 million in fees
and expenses in the first eleven weeks of this bankruptcy case, an average of approximately
$110,000 per week. Given the tasks accomplished through September 30 in the case, this seems
impossible. In the First Monthly Statements (as defined below) filed on November 1 for certain of
the Debtor’s professionals, the Debtor indicates that it has no objection to the fees incurred by its
professionals. Considering the amount of fees, the tasks accomplished and the period of time
involved, this too seems impossible. Given the lack of objection by the Debtor, there is no reason
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to believe that the Debtor intends to take action to curb the rate at which it’s professionals are
incurring fees. This is notwithstanding that (1) the Debtor has stated publicly and to this Court that
it filed this case so that it could treat survivors of sexual abuse fairly, (2) the Debtor has stated to
this Court and to the Committee that this is a “thin” case and (3) the Debtor’s annual gross revenue
and expenses are approximately $14.5 million, i.e., this case will be paid for from assets that would
otherwise be available to pay the claims of creditors. The Committee does not believe that the
Debtor’s professionals can or will change the way that they are staffing and working this case and
assumes that the Debtor’s professionals have incurred at least an additional $400,000 to $500,000
in fees since September 30. At the rate the Debtor’s professionals are incurring fees, any potential
distribution to creditors in this case—creditors who are almost exclusively survivors of sexual
abuse when minors by agents of the Debtor—will be rapidly and massively diminished. This case
needs to take a drastic turn to prevent that from happening. The Debtor’s exclusivity should
terminate on November 12, 2021, so that the Committee may quickly file and seek confirmation
of a plan that will get this case and what assets remain out of the control of the Debtor. In support
of its objection, the Committee respectfully states as follows:
1.

On July 15, 2021 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor commenced this case by filing

a petition under Chapter 11 title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) with this
Court.
2.

The Debtor is a Roman Catholic diocese in Connecticut and a small part of New

York founded in 1953 by Pope Pius XII, encompassing Middlesex, New London, Windham and
Tolland counties in Connecticut, as well as Fisher Island, New York. The Most Reverend Michael
R. Cote, D.D. has been the Bishop of the Diocese since May 14, 2003. There are fifty-one parishes
within the Debtor’s geographic territory, as well as three high schools and various other ministries.
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The Debtor’s gross revenue for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2020 was approximately
$14,340,626.00, while expenses before taking into account certain non-recurring activity were
approximately $14,155,607.00. See ECF Doc. No. 12, at ¶¶ 5, 15, 41, 42.
3.

The Debtor has asserted that it commenced this case because it was named as a

defendant in approximately fifty-four lawsuits brought by former Mount Saint John Academy
students alleging that they were sexually abused while attending the school.
4.

On the Petition Date, the Debtor issued a press release quoting Bishop Cote as

stating: “A Chapter 11 bankruptcy will allow the Court to centralize these lawsuits, as well as help
the Diocese manage its litigation expenses and preserve adequate financial resources for all
essential ministries. If the Diocese had not filed for bankruptcy, it would be unable to ensure that
all of the individuals who file claims are treated fairly and have equal access to the funds
available.” Press Release, The Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, Norwich Diocese Files
Chapter 11 to Ensure Fairness and Equity for Abuse Survivors, Manage Litigation Expenses &
Continue Essential Ministries (July 15, 2021), https://www.norwichdiocese.org/Portals/diocese
ofnorwich/CMAdmin/DIOCESE%20FILES%20CHAPTER%2011%20Press%20Release%20Jul
y%2012%202021%20FINAL%202_1.pdf (emphasis added). In a declaration filed on July 16,
2021, Reverend Peter J. Langevin, the Chancellor of the Debtor, stated that “[t]he Diocese does
not seek Chapter 11 relief to evade responsibility for any asserted abuse claims or for any decisions
made by Diocesan authorities when addressing that misconduct.” ECF Doc. No. 12, at ¶12.
5.

On August 20, 2021, the Court entered an order authorizing the Debtor to retain

EPIQ Corporate Restructuring, LLC (“EPIQ”), as its claims and noticing agent. ECF Doc. No.
168. The order approving EPIQ’s retention provides that the Debtor is authorized to pay EPIQ its
monthly invoices without need for EPIQ to file fee applications or otherwise seek Court approval.
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EPIQ is required to serve its monthly invoices on the US Trustee and the Committee, and has done
so, albeit belatedly. EPIQ billed the Debtor $43,350.08 in fees for the two weeks of July,
$31,276.25 in fees for August and $32,043.70 in fees for September, for a total of $106,670.03 for
the period from the Petition Date through September 30, 2021. Notwithstanding that EPIQ is a
Retained Professional within the meaning of the Court’s Monthly Fee Order (as defined below),
to date EPIQ has not filed a Monthly Statement with the Court.
6.

On September 9, 2021, the Court held a hearing on, among other matters, the

Debtor’s applications to retain Ice Miller LLP (“Ice Miller”) and Robinson & Cole LLP
(“Robinson & Cole”) as its attorneys and B. Riley Financial Advisory Services (“B. Riley”) as its
financial advisor. In the Debtor’s application to retain Ice Miller it was disclosed that Ice Miller
was paid $337,848.50 prior to the Petition Date in contemplation of and in connection with
preparation for the bankruptcy filing. In the Debtor’s application to retain Robinson & Cole it was
disclosed that Robinson & Cole was paid $50,000.00 prior to the Petition Date in contemplation
of and in connection with preparation for the bankruptcy filing. At the September 9 hearing, the
Court made clear that it was concerned about the level of administrative expenses in this case and
that it expected the Debtor’s lead counsel to ensure that the Debtor’s professionals are deployed in
in a way to minimize the level of administrative expenses.
7.

On September 17, 2021, the Court entered orders approving the retention of Ice

Miller as attorneys for the Debtor (ECF Doc. No. 272) and B. Riley as financial advisor to the
Debtor (ECF Doc. No. 271). On October 25, 2021, the Court entered an order approving the
retention of Robinson & Cole as attorneys for the Debtor (ECF Doc. No. 321).
8.

On October 18, 2021, the Court entered its Order Granting Debtor’s Motion for

Order Establishing Procedures for Interim Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses for
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Professionals (ECF Doc. No. 314, the “Monthly Fee Order”). Pursuant to the Monthly Fee Order,
Retained Professionals (as defined in the motion seeking entry of the Monthly Fee Order) may file
and serve a monthly statement for fees and expenses incurred in the prior month. The Monthly Fee
Order provides that the first Monthly Statement (a “First Monthly Statement”) shall cover the
period from the Petition Date through September 30, 2021. A Retained Professional may be paid
70% of its fees and 100% of its expenses pursuant to a procedure set forth in the Monthly Fee
Order, with the balance of the fees to be a holdback.
9.

On November 1, 2021, Ice Miller filed its First Monthly Statement. ECF Doc. ID

#338. Ice Miller’s First Monthly Statement indicates that Ice Miller incurred $532,748.50 in fees
from July 15, 2021, through September 30, 2021. The four largest categories in Ice Miller’s First
Monthly Statement are case administration for $282,235.00, first and second day motions for
$135,135.00, responding to US Trustee requests for $48,459.00, and firm and other employment
and fee applications for $32,660.00. Essentially all of the time in this last category was spent on
retention applications, as no fee applications were filed during this period. In a statement attached
to Ice Miller’s First Monthly Statement, Karen Huff, a representative of the Debtor, states that she
reviewed Ice Miller’s First Monthly Statement and does not object to the fees set forth therein.
10.

On November 1, 2021, B. Riley filed its First Monthly Statement. ECF Doc. ID

#337. B. Riley’s First Monthly Statement indicates that B. Riley incurred $342,916.50 in fees from
July 15, 2021, through September 30, 2021. The five largest categories in B. Riley’s First Monthly
Statement are business analysis for $102,852.50, analysis on behalf of U.S. Trustee for $90,256.50,
schedules and statements for $63,705.50, case administration for $29,657.00, and first- and
second-day motions for $23,246.00. In a statement attached to B. Riley’s First Monthly Statement,
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Karen Huff, a representative of the Debtor, states that she reviewed B. Riley’s First Monthly
Statement and does not object to the fees set forth therein.
11.

On November 1, 2021, Robinson & Cole filed its First Monthly Statement. ECF

Doc. ID #335. Robinson & Cole’s First Monthly Statement indicates that it incurred $171,986.50
in fees from July 15, 2021, through September 30, 2021. The three largest categories in Robinson
& Cole’s First Monthly Statement are case administration for $37,906.00, first and second day
motions for $29,972.50, and firm and other employment and fee applications for $57,893.50. As
with Ice Miller, essentially all of the time in this last category was spent on retention applications,
as no fee applications were filed during this period. In a statement attached to Robinson & Cole’s
First Monthly Statement, Karen Huff, a representative of the Debtor, states that she reviewed
Robinson & Cole’s First Monthly Statement and does not object to the fees set forth therein.
12.

Together, in the first eleven weeks of this case, Ice Miller, B. Riley, EPIQ, and

Robinson & Cole incurred fees of $1,154,321. Of this amount, $349,798.00 was for case
administration, $93,063.50 was on retention applications, $188,353.50 was on first- and secondday motions (excluding the retention applications), and $202,421.00 was on completing schedules
and responding to information requests from the U.S. Trustee.
13.

On November 1, 2021, the Debtor filed the Exclusivity Motion, seeking a 120-day

extension of its exclusive periods under Bankruptcy Code section 1121 to file and solicit
acceptance of a plan. In the Exclusivity Motion, the Debtor states:
Progress made by the Debtor to date includes, among other things: (i) obtaining
vital first- and second-day relief to provide for a smooth transition into chapter 11
and establish procedures for the efficient administration of this chapter 11 case; (ii)
completing and filing the Debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities and statement
of financial affairs; (iii) participating in the meeting of creditors under section 341
of the Bankruptcy Code; (iv) completing and filing monthly operating and
reconciliation reports and complying with UST and Committee requests for
documents and information, including complying with ongoing Rule 2004
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discovery propounded by the Committee; and (v) extensively negotiating the form,
content and timing of a complex proof of claim bar date procedure. The Debtor
accomplished a great deal in the first few months of this case and is well-positioned
for the next phase of these proceedings.
14.

Bankruptcy Code section 1121 provides in relevant part:

(b)
Except as otherwise provided in this section, only the debtor may
file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter.
(c)
Any party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’
committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security
holder, or any indenture trustee, may file a plan if and only if—
….
(2)
the debtor has not filed a plan before 120 days after the date
of the order for relief under this chapter; or
(3)
the debtor has not filed a plan that has been accepted, before
180 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter, by each
class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan.
(d)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), on request of a party in interest made within
the respective periods specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section and
after notice and a hearing, the court may for cause reduce or increase the
120-day period or the 180-day period referred to in this section.
15.

The party seeking an extension of exclusivity has the burden of proving cause. E.g.,

In re Borders Group, Inc., 460 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re R.G. Pharmacy, Inc.,
374 B.R. 484, 487 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007). Courts have not hesitated to deny a first motion to
extend exclusivity where the circumstances warrant. E.g., In re Borders Group, Inc., 460 B.R. at
821 (granting extension but stating that “[a]lthough this is the Debtors’ first request to extend their
Exclusive Periods, that fact, by itself, does not constitute cause for an extension.”); In re Gen.
Bearing Corp., 136 B.R. 361 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re All Season Indus., Inc., 121 B.R. 1002
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990); In re Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 30 B.R. 772 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983).
16.

In determining whether there is cause to extend the exclusivity period, some

courts have looked to the following nine factors: (1) the size and complexity of the case;
(2) the necessity for sufficient time to permit the debtor to negotiate a plan of reorganization
7

Case 21-20687

Doc 344

Filed 11/05/21

Entered 11/05/21 13:24:22

Page 8 of 13

and prepare adequate information; (3) the existence of good faith progress toward
reorganization; (4) the fact that the debtor is paying its bills as they become due; (5)
whether the debtor has demonstrated reasonable prospects for filing a viable plan; (6)
whether the debtor has made progress in negotiations with its creditors; (7) the amount of
time which has elapsed in the case; (8) whether the debtor is seeking an extension of
exclusivity in order to pressure creditors to submit to the debtor's reorganization demands;
and (9) whether an unresolved contingency exists. E.g., In re Borders Group, Inc., 460
B.R. at 822; In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 352 B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006); In re R.G. Pharmacy, Inc., 374 B.R. at 487; 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1121.06[2],
at 1121-11 (16th ed. 2020). Other courts have relied on the following four factors: (1) the
debtor’s use of the exclusivity period to force creditors to accept an unsatisfactory or
unconfirmable plan; (2) the debtor’s delay in filing a plan; (3) gross mismanagement of the
debtor’s operations; and (4) acrimonious relations between the debtor’s principals. In re
Fansteel, Inc., 2017 Bankr.LEXIS 551, at [*3] (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, February 28, 2017); In
re Situation Management Systems, Inc., 252 B.R. 859, 863 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000); In re
Texaco, Inc., 81 B.R. 806, 812 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[I]n those cases where the
exclusivity periods were reduced, factors such as gross mismanagement of the debtor’s
operations … were major obstacles to a successful reorganization and were regarded as
‘cause’ for the reduction of the exclusivity periods.”); 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶
1121.06[2], at 1121-11 to 1121-12 (16th ed. 2020). Common in these lists of factors and
relevant here, courts have found that an extension of exclusivity should not be granted, or
that exclusivity should be terminated, where a debtor’s mismanagement of its estate creates
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a major obstacle to filing a viable plan and where a debtor is using exclusivity to pressure
creditors to agree to an unsatisfactory plan.
17.

In defining a debtor in possession’s obligation to properly manage its estate, the

Supreme Court has held that “if a debtor remains in possession—that is, if a trustee is not
appointed—the debtor’s directors bear essentially the same fiduciary obligation to creditors … as
would the trustee for a debtor out of possession.” Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985).
A debtor in possession owes the same fiduciary duty as a trustee to the creditors
and the estate. The trustee’s fiduciary obligations also fall upon the officers and
managing employees who conduct the debtor in possession’s affairs. Indeed, the
willingness to leave the debtor in possession in charge of its assets rests upon the
assurance that its managers will carry out these fiduciary responsibilities. As
fiduciaries, the debtor in possession and its managers are obligated to treat all
parties to the case fairly, maximize the value of the estate, and protect and conserve
the debtor’s property. These duties parallel those imposed by [Bankruptcy Code]
section 549: to avoid depletion of the estate.
In re Centennial Textiles, 227 B.R. 606, 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted, emphasis
added). See also In re Reynolds, 2018 Bankr.LEXIS 1406, [*9] (Bankr. D. Utah May 9, 2018)
(“The trustee has the ultimate responsibility to see that estates are economically administered for
the benefit of unsecured creditors. This includes supervising and managing estate professionals to
verify that their services are necessary and reasonably likely to benefit unsecured creditors.”); In
re Abraham, 163 B.R. 772, 779 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (“There is one trustee ‘duty’ that can
never be delegated, and for which the trustee must always be held accountable. … The trustee and
only the trustee is ultimately responsible for the administration of the estate, including most
significantly the safeguarding and responsible disposition of estate assets and their distribution to
creditors. We expect the trustee to make sure that all those persons to whom duties have been
delegated do their jobs right—or else.”).
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Under no conceivable standard of reasonableness can $1,154,321 in fees incurred

over the course of eleven weeks be justified in a case of this size and complexity given what has
been accomplished to date. This is not a large case—as noted above, the Debtor’s gross revenue
and expenses are approximately $14.5 million. The Committee agrees with some of what the
Debtor claims in the Exclusivity Motion has been accomplished in the case to date. The Debtor
was able to get five first day motions—wages, cash management, noticing procedures, insurance
and utilities—granted, several pro hac vice motions granted, four retention applications granted,
and the motion to approve the Monthly Fee Order filed. The problem is that the Debtor’s
professionals incurred $281,417.00 in fees to accomplish these tasks. The Debtor was able to
complete and file the Debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities and statement of financial affairs,
participate in the meeting of creditors under section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code and comply with
US Trustee requests for documents and information. The problem is that the Debtor’s professionals
incurred more than $200,000.00 in fees to accomplish that. This is not a case where a debtor’s
professionals were retained shortly before filing and needed to expend substantial time getting up
to speed on the debtor’s affairs after filing. Ice Miller was retained by the Debtor approximately
one year prior to the Petition Date and as noted above the Debtor’s attorneys incurred
approximately $388,000 in fees prior to the Petition Date specifically in contemplation of and to
prepare for the filing. In the undersigned’s experience, in a case of this size, to get to the point that
this case is at, Debtor’s professional fees should be at a fraction (one-fifth or less) of what has been
incurred here.
19.

That the Debtor does not object to the fees incurred by its professionals through

September indicates that (a) the Debtor does not understand what is going on, (b) the Debtor does
not understand that it has a fiduciary obligation to minimize the fees incurred in the case, (c) the
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Debtor does not care what level of professional fees is incurred because it understands that the
money being spent would otherwise go to creditors, (d) the Debtor consciously wants its
professional fees to be as high as they are in order to pressure creditors to quickly agree to a plan
or face the risk that a substantial portion of the assets available to pay claims will be eaten up by
professional fees, or (e) a combination of the forgoing. It simply is not possible that the Debtor
would support incurring $110,000.00 per week in professional fees unless one or a combination
of the foregoing was not true.
20.

As noted above, the Debtor essentially breaks even on an annual basis, so that a

distribution from the Debtor to creditors in this case will come in large part if not entirely from the
Debtor’s available assets. At the rate that the Debtor’s professionals are incurring fees, the Debtor’s
available assets will rapidly be diminished and the accrual of administrative expenses will quickly
become a major obstacle to a fair plan in this case. Given the level of fees relative to the tasks
accomplished thus far, the Committee does not trust the Debtor and its professionals to formulate
and seek confirmation of a plan without incurring another seven-figure sum of fees in doing so, a
multiple of what is necessary and appropriate in a case of this size.
21.

Notwithstanding the Debtor’s public statements that it is not trying to evade

responsibility for abuse claims and that it wants to treat survivors of abuse fairly, the Debtor is
rapidly spending for its own benefit and purposes money that should be available to sexual abuse
survivors. The Committee submits that the Debtor is seeking to improperly use exclusivity to
pressure creditors to agree to less than what is fair in the facts and circumstances. Essentially, if
creditors do not quickly reach a deal, they face the risk that the Debtor’s professionals will rapidly
consume a very large portion of what is available to pay them.
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Given the rate at which the Debtor’s professionals are consuming assets, this case

and the Debtor’s assets must be taken out of the hands of the Debtor as soon as possible. The case
is at a critical point. Based on the Debtor’s massive failure to properly manage this case and the
Debtor’s assets, the Committee may consider seeking the appointment of a trustee, but is
concerned that, inter alia, at the rate that the Debtor’s professionals incur fees, litigation on a
motion to appoint a trustee could cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, the Committee is
objecting to an extension of exclusivity so that it may quickly and efficiently seek confirmation of
a plan that will place the Debtor’s available assets in a trust-type entity and lodge with that entity
the responsibility to efficiently resolve claims and pursue and liquidate assets, including insurance
coverage. Given the rate at which the Debtor’s professionals are consuming assets, this cannot
wait until a proof of claim bar date has passed.
23.

The Debtor’s failure to manage its professional fees, and failure to object to the

professional fees detailed in the First Monthly Statements filed by the Debtor’s professionals,
constitutes a breach by the Debtor of one of the chief among a debtor in possession’s fiduciary
obligations: to manage its assets in a way that maximizes their value. The Debtor appears to have
simply abdicated that duty or is consciously pursuing a strategy of running up administrative
expenses for the purpose of pressuring creditors to accept less than they should. Given that failure
to properly manage this case and the conscious improper purposes, there is no way that the Debtor
can meet its burden of demonstrating that it should be granted an extension of its time to file and
seek confirmation of a plan.
WHEREFORE, the Committee respectfully requests that this Court sustain this objection,
deny the Exclusivity Motion, and grant the Committee such other relief as is just.
Dated this 5th day of November, 2021.
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THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED
CREDITORS FOR THE NORWICH ROMAN
CATHOLIC DIOCESAN CORPORATION

By: /s/ Eric Henzy
Eric Henzy (ct12849)
Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640)
Christopher H. Blau (ct30120)
ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.
10 Middle Street, 15th floor
Bridgeport, CT 06605
Telephone: (203) 368-4234
Email: ehenzy@zeislaw.com
skindseth@zeislaw.com
cblau@zeislaw.com
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